The value of option grants to CEOs is defined in two different ways. Fair values are grant-date estimates of expected values from future option contract settlement. Payouts from exercise are realized values from option contract settlement. We refer to the cumulative difference between the fair values and payouts over an individual CEO's tenure as "ex post estimation error" (EPEE), because it represents information about option contract settlement that is not available at the grant dates. We find that the average EPEE amounts to 27% of the fair value of option grants among all ExecuComp CEOs from 1992 to 2009, contrary to beliefs that fair values are unbiased or they understate option-related payments that CEOs take home. We find that EPEE also varies with agency relations between CEOs and shareholders. EPEE is significantly higher in companies with outsider CEOs and in companies with high institutional ownership. These findings imply that agency relations between CEOs and shareholders influence option contract settlement and that pay comparisons that ignore option contract settlement may be misleading.
Introduction
Despite the vast interest in CEO pay that is manifest in shareholder activism campaigns and business press, the value of option grants to CEOs lacks a unified definition. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) mandates that companies simultaneously report two definitions in their filings: Fair values that represent expected values from future settlement of option contracts; and payouts from option exercise that represent realized cash values from the eventual settlement of option contracts. Out of the two definitions, more attention is given to the fair values, partly because of the SEC's requirement that they are disclosed in the summary annual compensation table. Moreover, academic studies on CEO pay usually argue that fair values represent the economic cost of-and incentives provided by-option grants and that payouts from exercises do not provide any incremental information about the value of option grants (Core et al., 2008) . Nevertheless, a fast-growing number of companies highlight disclosures of payouts and refer to payouts as their preferred definition of option pay, largely in response to shareholder activism campaigns (Chasan, 2102) .
We argue that the difference between fair values and payouts offers important information that is not available at the grant dates, because option contracts include many contingencies and provisions about future payouts that are resolved only during the contracting period (i.e., the full tenure of an individual CEO). We refer to the cumulative difference between the grant-date fair values and payouts from exercise over the full tenure of a CEO as the ex post estimation error (EPEE) and investigate properties of EPEE, particularly in light of the agency relations between the CEO and shareholders.
It has long been recognized that the value of options in the hands of a risk-averse executive differs from the value of options in the hands of a risk-neutral investor and that option features such as vesting and forfeiture upon termination of employment affect the fair value of stock options (Huddart and Lang, 1996; Carpenter, 1998) . Various methods have been proposed to deal with such measurement issues when using Black-Scholes and other option pricing methods (Cvitanic et al., 2008; Bettis et al., 2005; Hull and White, 2004) . Companies have long used these methods to compute fair values of their option grants. Because these computations reflect adjustments for early exercise behavior and turnover (Huddart and Lang, 1996) , our ex ante prediction is that EPEE is not different from zero for a large sample over a long period.
Empirically, we investigate compensation packages over the full tenure of individual CEOs in the ExecuComp database between the years 1992 and 2009 and find that average EPEE amounts to 27% of fair values of option grants. In other words, CEOs on average took home only 73% of the reported fair values of their options during their tenure. Our findings survive several sensitivity checks and are generally robust across years and industries. While it is not surprising that realized payouts deviate from fair values (i.e., grant-date expectations of future payouts) for an individual CEO, the finding of economically significant and statistically robust EPEE for a large sample over a long period reveals information relevant for the debate about the perceived "excessive" CEO compensation (Bebchuk and Grinstein, 2005; Gabaix and Landier, 2008) .
The cumulative fair value estimates differ from cumulative payouts at the individual CEO level for two reasons. First is the natural estimation error that originates from future stock prices as well as unbiased errors in inputs to option pricing models such as return volatility, dividend yield, and risk-free rate (Hodder et al., 2006) . This type of error should not be systematically affected by agency relations between the CEO and shareholders. Second is the estimation error that results from conditional terms in option contracts. For instance, option contracts include preset contingencies such as performance and time vesting conditions and forced exercise or forfeiture on CEO departure.
1 Furthermore, companies can modify option terms after the option grants by, for example, revising vesting conditions, black-out periods, or equity-holding requirements; repricing underwater options; or forcing forfeiture of options when CEOs step down. Overall, option contract settlement depends in part on the resolution of such contingencies and modification of option terms. Various agency relations between the CEO and shareholders.
may affect this type of estimation error. To investigate, we predict how EPEE varies with two agency relations that shape CEO compensation in general: Boards' decision to hire outsider
CEOs and the extent of institutional ownership.
Outsider CEOs possess transferable (general) skills yet face uncertainty about their talent and fit with the firm (Murphy and Zabojnik, 2007) . Based on this characterization, adverse selection theory predicts that an outsider CEO is offered, and is willing to accept, higher performancebased pay and total pay than an insider CEO (Lazear, 1986) . In other words, option grants effectively match pay to the uncertain talent of an outsider CEO as information about talent becomes available from firm performance during the CEO's tenure (Arya and Mittendorf, 2005) .
In this setting, pre-set contingencies and post-grant modifications to option terms likely facilitate a more effective matching of pay and talent during the CEO's tenure (Gillan et al., 2009 ).
Consistent with this prediction, we find that outsider CEOs realized a significantly smaller portion of the fair values of their option grants (55%) than insider CEOs did (84%). The finding of higher EPEE for outsider CEOs persists after controlling for determinants of option pay including performance and length of tenure. From a different perspective, payouts from exercise as well as total payouts are not statistically different between outsider and insider CEOs, 1 It is difficult to value performance vesting conditions that depend on subjective metrics other than stock returns. Because of the unique CEO-company relationship, it is not practical to estimate a quit rate for an individual CEO that may be used to accurately price time vesting and forfeiture provisions.
suggesting that the well-known pay differential between outsider and insider CEOs are fully offset by differences in option contract settlement in the subsequent years.
Previous research documents that CEO compensation is lower and more sensitive to firm performance when stockholdings are concentrated among institutional investors (Hartzell and Starks, 2003) . This evidence is consistent with less severe agency problems between CEOs and institutional shareholders. We investigate whether institutional ownership also provides a more effective disciplining effect on CEO compensation through option settlement. We find that this is (Yermack, 1998; Aboody et al., 2006) . A corollary of these findings is that CEOs who manipulate fair values of option grants will be able to take home more than the reported fair values in the long run (Ho, 2012) . Our comparison of cumulative fair values with cumulative payouts over the full tenure of individual CEOs does not support this prediction.
Finally, our findings are consistent with adverse selection theory. In response to uncertain talent of outsider CEOs and uncertain match with the outsider CEOs, companies not only increase the weight of options in the CEO compensation package but also use conditional terms in option contracts to limit option settlement values. Furthermore, institutional investors help grant CEOs not only lower expected compensation but also lower take-home pay relative to the expected compensation.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the contracting environment between the CEO and the company, and develops our hypotheses. Section 3 describes the sample. Section 4 presents empirical results. Section 5 concludes with a discussion of the study's implications.
Hypothesis Development
Based on information available at the reporting date, companies compute fair values of CEO option pay as value estimates from future option contract settlement. 2 Companies report option payouts as the number of options exercised times the exercise premium (stock price net of exercise price) at the dates of contract settlement. 3 The literature on executive compensation has not fully explored the differences between the two definitions. 4 The literature primarily uses fair values, because economists view fair values as regular and representative of incentives provided by option grants and, in contrast, payouts from option exercises as irregular and unrepresentative of incentives provided by option grants (Core and Guay, 1999) . Nevertheless, some studies argue that option payouts are essential for the debate on whether CEO pay levels are excessive. Leone et al. (2006) argue that payouts strongly reward past performance and fair values do not.
Similarly, Kaplan (2008) (Chasan, 2102) . Kaplan and Rauh (2010) suspect that confusion over the relation between executive pay and performance arises because "critics focus on ex ante or estimated pay rather than realized pay."
Ex post estimation error
Stock option grants are key elements of dynamic contracting between the company and the CEO (Gillan et al., 2009; Hall and Liebman, 1998) . Option grants cannot be sold or transferred, and their exercisability is subject to-besides future stock prices-various pre-set contingencies and post-grant modifications of option terms. First, there are various time-and performancevesting contingencies for exercisability (Bettis et al., 2010) . Second, the company sets insidertrading rules such as blackout periods and equity holding requirements that influence option settlement. Third, the company can force the CEO to leave, resulting in the CEO forfeiting (Rubinstein, 1995 6 Overall, the transfer of exercise rights to the CEO is quite incomplete at the grant date, largely depending on pre-set contingencies and interactions between the company and the CEO over the contracting period.
As one specific case about the incomplete transfer of exercise rights on grant-date values, early studies extensively acknowledged that risk-averse early exercise behavior and employee turnover reduce payouts from option exercises (Hemmer et al., 1996; Cuny and Jorion, 1995; Huddart and Lang, 1996) . These articles propose-and the subsequent SAB No. 107
encouraged-that companies estimate fair values using the Black and Scholes (1973) model after substituting the shorter expected term of options for the full contractual term (SEC, 2005) . Other studies proposed alternative pricing methods such as analytic formulas (Cvitanic et al., 2008 ) and lattice models that incorporate time vesting and performance vesting based on stock returns, riskaverse exercise behavior and turnover (Bettis et al., 2005; Carpenter, 1998; Hull and White, 2004 (Mun, 2004) . Empirical evidence shows that early exercise behavior due to risk aversion can be addressed with the use of expected term in analytic models and a stock to strike price ratio in lattice models (Bettis et al., 2005) . The effects of employee turnover can be addressed with quit rates in lattice and analytic models (Cvitanic et al., 2008; Hull and White, 2004) . Kaplan and Minton (2012) and Hermalin (2005) show that CEO tenure is more volatile and shorter than previously recognized, because cancellation, forfeiture, and early exercises of stock options affect CEOs more than other employees. Cvitanic et al. (2008) We develop two hypotheses to evaluate whether EPEE varies with agency relations between CEOs and shareholders.
Ex post estimation errors among outsider versus insider CEOs
Hiring a CEO from outside versus promoting a CEO from within is an important decision facing shareholders and their boards. Outsider hiring is associated with the new CEO having more general managerial talent (Murphy and Zabojnik, 2007) ; charisma or super-star status (Khurana, 2002; Malmendier and Tate, 2009) ; and the new CEO using a talent agent (Rajgopal 8 As discussed above, a popular approach is the Black-Scholes model with the expected term substituted for the contractual term. Until the passage of SFAS 123R in 2004, the SEC also permitted the use of a simple method that assumed a fixed annual stock return of 5% or 10% between the years of option grants and exercises. 9 The CEO compensation research has extensively relied on these computed values. As a sensitivity check in Section 4.2, we show that the ex post estimation error is substantially larger when we replace the ExecuComp-computed values with the company-reported values. et al., 2012) . At the same time, outsider CEOs face greater uncertainty about their talent as well as their relationship with their companies (Gillan et al., 2009 ). The adverse selection models predict higher incentive pay and total pay under greater uncertainty (Lazear, 1986) . Companies use options more extensively in order to match pay with talent (Arya and Mittendorf, 2005) .
Empirical evidence to date finds that outsider CEOs with general managerial skills receive higher pay than insiders with firm-specific human capital (Custodio et al., 2013) .
Hiring an outsider CEO suggests less executive entrenchment and more active involvement by shareholders in the hiring and compensation process. The visibility of an outsider attracts greater shareholder scrutiny. Shareholders have higher performance expectations and pay a premium for an outsider CEO. 10 Higher performance expectations, greater visibility, more scrutiny by shareholders, along with more uncertainty about the fit between the CEO and the company, likely increase the role of contingencies in the settlement of options. In line with this adverse selection argument, performance-vesting conditions are used more frequently for firms hiring outsider CEOs to attract top talent (Bettis et al., 2010; Gerakos et al., 2007) and for firms in which sustainability of the relationship with the CEOs are less certain (Gillan et al., 2009 ). In sum, companies that use options more extensively to match pay to talent for outsider CEOs are likely to use pre-set contingencies and post-grant modifications more extensively to limit option settlement values. Overall, we predict a higher ex post estimation error for outsider CEOs versus insider CEOs.
H1. Ex post estimation error is higher for outsider CEOs than insider CEOs.
10 Anecdotal evidence indicates shareholder discontent over higher pay of outsider CEOs (Ferris, 2010) . Jensen et al. (2004) argue that outsider CEOs receive "too much" compensation. Cazier and McInnis (2010) find that firms pay a premium to outsiders for prior performance, which is "…nevertheless not a predictor of high performance." In their review of executive succession research, Kesner and Sebora (1994) do not observe any convergence in the literature about the relation between outsider CEOs and performance. However, Huson et al. (2004) find that outsider CEOs perform better. Similarly, Rajgopal et al. (2012) find that CEOs with talent agents perform better. Hartzell and Starks (2003) find that the expected value of annual CEO pay is more sensitive to performance and lower in magnitude when institutional ownership is greater and more concentrated. These findings are consistent with institutional shareholders playing a monitoring role that reduces agency problems in contracting between CEOs and their firms (Cheng and Indjejikian, 2009 ). The pre-set contingencies for vesting or forfeiture and provisions that can be modified after the option grants make it possible for institutional shareholders to also influence option settlement. In their exploratory study, Carter et al. (2009) find that greater external monitoring by institutional investors is associated with tougher overall relative performance evaluation conditions. Overall, direct or indirect pressure from institutional investors may serve to reduce option settlement values relative to grant-date values.
Ex post estimation error and institutional ownership

H2. Ex post estimation error increases with institutional ownership.
Sample
We obtain CEO pay data for fiscal years between 1992 and 2009 from the ExecuComp database. We require non-missing pay data over CEO tenure, non-missing financials from the CRSP and Compustat databases, a press release about an insider or outsider CEO appointment from the Factiva database, and supporting turnover information about CEO arrival and departure dates from ExecuComp. In order to allow for the accumulation of compensation data over CEO In order to make unbiased comparisons between option pay and payouts, we adjust annual We also compute, but do not tabulate, pay comparisons during the first and last years of CEO tenure. Not surprisingly, average option pay is significantly higher in the first year ($4,367,000) than in the last year of CEO tenure ($1,716,000), and average payouts from option exercises are significantly higher in the last year ($2,543,000) than in the first year ($1,005,000). The large variance in fair values of option grants and option payouts across years justifies our methodology of comparing average option values over the completed tenure of individual CEOs.
Differences between fair values of option grants and option payouts
Determinants of CEO pay
The previous literature relates CEO pay levels to various company characteristics.
Accordingly, we control for the following characteristics while testing the relation between pay levels and outsider CEOs and institutional ownership:
Firm size: Estimated pay and payouts increase with size (Gabaix and Landier, 2008) . We use the natural logarithm of sales as the proxy for company size.
Operational risk: CEO option grants increase with firms' operational risk (Aggarwal and Samwick, 1999; Garen, 1994) . If higher risk, in addition, requires larger premiums, we expect a positive relation between firm risk and CEO pay levels. We use the standard deviation of residuals from the annual regression of daily firm stock returns on market returns as the proxy for operational risk.
Growth opportunities:
The option pay and total pay of CEOs increase with growth opportunities (Smith and Watts, 1992) . We use firm age and book-to-market of company assets as inverse proxies of a company's growth opportunities.
Distress: Limited by their ability to pay, companies in financial distress pay their CEOs less and grant them fewer options (Gilson and Vetsuypens, 1993) . We use leverage, defined as total liabilities divided by total assets, as the proxy for financial distress.
Industry: CEO pay varies across industries because of factors such as the level of innovation, CEO monitoring costs, and sensitivity of performance to executives' actions. We use FamaFrench industry indicators to control for these differences.
Shareholder activism and corporate governance
The CEO pay levels have increased dramatically during the past two decades with much of the increase in the form of stock option grants. As evidenced by media attention, regulatory interventions, and shareholder activism, negative sentiment about CEO pay has also risen in recent years, with stock options criticized for boosting CEO pay levels and rewarding CEOs based on luck (Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2001; Garvey and Milbourn, 2006 Weaknesses in corporate governance have also been cited for contributing to excessive pay or insufficient sensitivity of pay to performance. We control for various dimensions of corporate governance that have been linked to CEO compensation . These include duality of CEO and Chair of the Board of Directors, the percentage of directors who are independent of management, board size, average director age, and the percentage of directors who were selected by the current CEO. companies.
Descriptive information
An average CEO stays at the top of the company for 5.1 years and holds 0.8% of company shares. 12% of the sample companies are targeted at least once by a compensation-related shareholder proposal or a vote-no campaign. CEOs of 53% of the sample companies are also chairs on the board of directors. On average, there are 9.6 directors on the boards, 68% of whom are independent directors. Average age of directors is 59.1, and 22% of the directors are chosen during the tenure of incumbent CEOs.
Univariate relations between CEO compensation and control variables
In untabulated pair-wise correlations, we observe that the logarithm of EPEE is significantly correlated with the following variables: i) CEO performance, measured by logarithm of stock returns (negatively), and ROA (negatively); ii) company size, measured by logarithm of company sales (positively); iii) operational risk, measured by logarithm of volatility in market-adjusted returns (positively); iv) growth opportunities, measured inversely by the book-to-market ratio (negatively); and v) distress, measured by leverage (positively). Consistent with the negative correlation between EPEE and CEO performance, CEO performance variables correlate more strongly with Total Payout than with Total Pay. These correlations support Kaplan's (2008) argument that payouts to CEOs are more sensitive to performance than estimated pay. As discussed above, the greater sensitivity of payouts to performance comes from two sources. First is the sensitivity of payouts to stock returns that comes from holding options between the grant and exercise dates. Second is the sensitivity that comes through the contingencies on exercisability of options as well as post-grant modifications to option terms that are explicitly or implicitly tied to company performance. Companies that observe poor (good) performance may tighten (release) existing restrictions, create (not create) new restrictions, and, in the extreme case, terminate their contracts (continue) with the incumbent CEOs. We argue that these dynamics are associated with agency relations between the CEO and the company.
Univariate relations between outsiders and CEO compensation
We test H1 using an indicator variable Outsider, which is hand-collected from CEO appointment announcements in the Factiva database. Following Huson et al. (2004) , we define
Outsider as one if the CEO transfers from another firm within one year before the new appointment, and zero otherwise. Outsider is one (zero) for 28% (72%) of the sample. Panel A of Table 2 experience. Therefore, we do not make a prediction about the difference in EPEE between those with top-five executive experience (Column 3) and those without such experience (Column 4).
We do see higher levels of EPEE for outsiders with executive experience corresponding to their higher pay levels but the ratio of EPEE to Total Pay is similar across these groups (20.5% for those with top-five experience and 19.1% for those with no executive experience). The average ratio of EPEE to Total Pay is highest for outsider CEOs with same-industry experience (25.7%), possibly reflecting greater performance expectations for these CEOs.
Univariate relations between institutional ownership and CEO compensation
Panel A of Table 3 provides univariate information for CEO compensation at firms with low (below median percentage) and high (above median percentage) institutional ownership. Firms with high institutional ownership use less option pay and pay less in total than firms with low institutional ownership, consistent with substitution between monitoring by institutional shareholders and the use of compensation incentives (Hartzell and Starks, 2003) . Average EPEE is similar between the high and low institutional ownership groups ($688,000 versus $736,000) but the median EPEE ($428,000 versus $213,000) and the ratio of EPEE to Total Pay (18.5% versus 11.8%) are significantly higher for the high institutional ownership group. This is consistent with stricter use of contingencies and post-grant actions that reduce option settlement values when institutional ownership is higher.
Panel B of Table 3 further divides low and high institutional ownership based on Herfindahl concentration index of institutional owners, which is defined as the sum of squares of ownership percentages of all institutions that invest in the company (Hartzell and Starks, 2003) . Option pay is highest for the low institutional ownership and low concentration group, reflecting the greater use of incentive compensation when shareholder monitoring is weak. Interestingly, EPEE is very low for this group, indicating that contractual contingencies do not play an important role in this group. Option pay is lowest for the high institutional ownership and high concentration group, again reflecting the substitution between shareholder monitoring and incentive compensation.
When institutional ownership is more concentrated (under both low and high institutional ownership), the ratio of EPEE to Total Pay is significantly higher than when institutional ownership is less concentrated. This indicates that shareholder pressure from concentrated institutional ownership is associated with greater use of contingencies and post-grant modifications that reduce option settlement values.
Results
We estimate the following model where all variables are annual averages over CEO tenure: Other results are similar to those presented in Panel A.
Robustness checks Beginning option holdings
We repeat the analysis using 981 CEOs with no option holdings at the beginning of their tenure. We do this to alleviate concerns that the findings may be biased due to beginning option holdings, despite the adjustment on Option Payout for the beginning option holdings. The results in Tables 4 and 5 use adjusted values of option exercise described earlier (option payout is reduced by the intrinsic value of options held at the beginning of CEO tenure and is increased by the intrinsic value of options held at the end of CEO tenure). When we reperform our analyses with unadjusted payout data, the results are stronger and directionally the same as the reported results.
One-time cash payments
Signing bonuses and severance payments may compensate CEOs for unexercised options at both the front and back ends of their tenure. Signing bonuses and severance pay, which are dubbed golden hellos and goodbyes, can represent large costs to shareholders (Yermack, 2006 
Drivers of CEO performance
CEOs and other executives can extract rents simply by being lucky and riding favorable trends (Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2001; Bill et al., 2013) . To investigate the differential role of luck in option pay versus payouts, we follow prior literature (Garvey and Milbourn, 2006) and divide CEO performance into average industry performance (which can be attributed to luck) and industry-adjusted performance (which can be attributed to CEO's effort or talent).
Untabulated tests show that both average industry-specific and industry-adjusted returns negatively correlate with EPEE. We conclude that the performance contingency of option payouts applies to both drivers of CEO performance, i.e., luck as well as effort or talent.
Conclusion
We document positive and economically significant ex-post estimation errors on the fair value of option grants to CEOs of S&P 1500 companies, regardless of whether this estimation is carried out by the companies themselves or the independent Execucomp database. This error, which is persistent across calendar time and industries, is significantly larger for outsider CEOs than for insider CEOs. In other words, the settlement of option contracts for outsider CEOs is more restricted by pre-set contingencies and post-grant modifications of option terms. These findings support the adverse selection arguments, which predict more contingent pay for outsider CEOs who usually have greater general skills but more uncertain prospects in their new companies (Hermalin, 2005; Malmendier and Tate, 2009 ). Previous studies show that outsider CEOs receive higher estimated pay but they do not perform significantly better than insider CEOs. Our evidence extends these findings by suggesting that a balancing occurs in CEO compensation through option contract settlement. When the CEO's full tenure is considered, option payouts of an outsider CEO and, in turn, her total payouts are not statistically different from those of an insider CEO. Our finding of lower option payouts relative to the value of option grants among companies with more institutional shareholders provides additional evidence that shareholder vigilance does influence option contract settlement.
Overall, the observation of substantial ex post estimation error contributes to debate about the excessiveness of CEO pay and sensitivity of CEO pay to performance (Bebchuk and Grinstein, 2005; Gabaix and Landier, 2008) . The evaluation of CEO pay levels is likely to be more complete when it includes information from both grant-date fair values and payouts from option exercises. For instance, Core et al. (2008) find that negative press coverage of executive compensation is correlated with both estimated total pay and payouts from option exercise. Core et al. (2008) argue that the press misinterprets payouts from option exercise as components of annual pay. An alternative explanation suggested by our results is that the press monitors payouts because of the additional information about option contract settlement that is not available from fair values. Similarly, in their study of long-term trends in executive pay, Frydman and Saks (2010) argue that the rapid increase in the level and cross-sectional variance in executive pay since 1970's have likely occurred because of improved board diligence and the resulting surge in outsider CEOs, faster CEO turnover, and forced departures. Our study complements this explanation. The surge in outsider CEOs, CEO turnover, and forced departures are all significant factors that reduce payouts to CEOs. Therefore, long-term growth in payouts to CEOs must be less dramatic than long-term growth in reported CEO pay.
The objective of our paper is not to argue that CEO pay contracts are inexpensive for shareholders. Both estimated pay and realized payouts to CEOs amount to millions of dollars per year in S&P 1500 companies, arguably high levels when compared to benchmarks such as pay of other executives and CEO pay in other countries. Rather, our evidence partially dispels concerns about the rent extraction arguments (Bebchuk et al., 2002) . The payouts to CEOs over their tenure (and correspondingly realized costs to shareholders) are not as excessive, as insensitive to performance, or as high for outsiders as estimated pay levels (such as the heavily-used option deltas suggest). We believe these findings will be of interest to company boards, shareholders, and regulators. Policies for improving corporate governance and corporate disclosures need to consider that cash realization of option grants to CEOs differs significantly from the fair values reported at the grant dates and that these differences are shaped by agency relations between the CEO and shareholders.
Appendix: Variable Definitions and Measurement
[Source] refers to the data source, where (data item) is the variable name in the data source. The sum of perquisites, other personal benefits, signing bonuses, termination and change-in-control payments, contributions to defined contribution plans (e.g., 401K plans), life insurance premiums, gross-ups and other tax reimbursements, discounted share purchases. We set negative values (less than 0.5% of the observations) to zero.
CEO compensation variables
LTIP (LTIP in 1992 format and NonEq_Incent in 2006 format): The amount paid to the CEO under the company's long-term incentive plan for years between 1992 and 2005. These plans measure company performance over a period of more than one year (generally three years). In the new 2006 format, LTIP is set as Non-Equity Incentive Plan Compensation, defined as the value of amounts earned during the year pursuant to non-equity incentive plans. The amount is disclosed in the year that the performance criterion was satisfied and the compensation was earned. We set negative values (less than 1% of the sample) to zero.
Stock Pay (Rstkgrnt in 1992 format and Stock_awards_fv in 2006 format): The fair value of restricted stocks granted to the CEO during the grant year. We set negative values (less than 1% of the sample) to zero. This definition is distinct from stock_awards in the 2006 format, which reports the cost that is charged to the company based upon the value of shares that vested during the year according to FAS 123R.
Option Pay (Option_awards_blk_value in 1992 format and Option_awards_fv in 2006 format): The fair value of option grants to the CEO. The valuations are carried out and reported by ExecuComp database using the modified Black and Scholes method. This definition is distinct from option_awards in the 2006 format, which reports cost that is charged to the company and thus to shareholders based upon the value of options vested during the year according to FAS 123R.
Option Payout (Opt_exer_val in both 1992 and 2006 formats with an adjustment): Value realized from option exercises. Option Payout is defined as the number of exercised options multiplied by the difference between the exercise price and the stock price on the exercise date. We exclude the beginningand end-of-tenure option holdings in order to compare only options granted and exercised throughout the CEO's tenure. We add the value of end-of-tenure vested option holdings divided by tenure (assuming that the exercise rights are fully transferred to the CEO), and subtract the value of beginning-of-tenure vested and unvested option holdings divided by tenure (reasoning that related exercises are due to options granted before the executive assumes the CEO position). We set negative values (less than 1% of the sample) to zero.
Total Pay: The sum of Salary, Bonus, Other Pay, LTIP, Stock Pay, and Option Pay. Total Payout: Cash-equivalent payout to the CEO, adjusted for the beginning-and end-of-tenure option holdings. Total Payout is the sum of Salary, Bonus, Other Pay, LTIP, Stock Pay, and Option Payout.
Ex Post Estimation Error or EPEE: The annualized difference between Total Pay and Total Payout. Alternatively, it is the difference between Option Pay and Option Payout.
Aggregate EPEE: EPEE aggregated over the individual CEO's tenure.
Financial variables
All financial variables are averaged over company fiscal years of CEO's tenure, including the first and last fiscal years during which the executive partially assumes the CEO position.
Return: Delisting-return-adjusted stock returns during the CEO's tenure [CRSP] . ROA: Income before extraordinary items (ib) deflated by beginning-of-the-year total assets (at) [Compustat] . ROA is winsorized at +1 and -1. The winsorized observations consist of fewer than 0.5% of the sample.
Sales: Company sales (Sale) [Compustat] . Sales is adjusted for inflation using CPI-U index to reflect 2009 year-end values in million $'s.
Risk: Standard deviation of residuals from a market model regression of monthly company stock returns on value-weighted market returns, estimated over 36 months of returns ending with the fiscal year-end subject to a minimum of 12 monthly returns [CRSP] .
B/M: Book-to-market of assets, defined as total assets (at) deflated by the sum of total liabilities (lt) and MCap [Compustat] .
Leverage: The sum of current and long-term liabilities (dlc, dltt) deflated by total assets (at) [Compustat] .
Firm Age: Number of years between the current fiscal year and the first fiscal year company financials appear in the Compustat database, the earliest of which is set to be 1980.
Corporate governance variables
All variables are averaged over company fiscal years of CEO's tenure, including the first and last fiscal years during which the executive fills the CEO position.
Outsider: Indicator variable that is one if the incoming CEO transfers from another company or if the CEO had worked for the company shorter than a year before being appointed as CEO, and zero if incoming CEO was promoted within the firm or if the CEO had worked with the firm for more than a year before the promotion [Factiva] .
Institutional Ownership: Average percentage of shares held by institutional owners that hold more than 1% of company stock during the CEO's tenure based on 13F forms filed with the SEC [Thomson Reuters] .
Targeted: Indicator variable that is equal to one if the firm is targeted by a compensation-related shareholder proposal or vote-no campaign during the CEO's tenure [Factiva, LexisNexis, RiskMetrics, Georgeson] .
CEO Tenure: The number of years the CEO remained in the office, including the first and last fiscal years during which the executive partially assumes the CEO position.
CEO Panel B presents results of six models regressing CEO pay variables on Outsider, Institutional Ownership, and other financial and corporate governance variables for the sample of CEOs without beginning option holdings. The dependent variables are presented at the top of each column. All compensation and financial variables are adjusted for inflation (CPI-U) to show 2009 $'s. The log of a variable is defined as the natural logarithm of $1 plus the variable. $1 is added to avoid missing values in case the underlying variable is $0. Since its underlying variable can be both positive and negative, Log (EPEE) is defined in a stepwise approach. Log (EPEE) is defined as the following: Log (EPEE+1) if EPEE>=0, and (-1)*Log (-1*(EPEE-1)) if EPEE<0. Two-digit SIC industry fixed effects are included in the regressions, but not reported for brevity. Huber-White-adjusted t-statistics are reported in parentheses below each coefficient estimate. ***, **, and * indicate 1%, 5%, and 10% significance, respectively. The Appendix provides variable definitions. 
